‘Frontline’ examines the hazards of flying on regional carriers

‘Frontline’ examines the hazards of flying on regional carriers
By Rob Owen
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
February 9, 2010

If you fly with any regularity out of Pittsburgh International Airport, you’ve probably flown on a regional carrier, the smaller planes that nowadays are more often jets but still can be propeller-driven “prop planes.”

These aircraft carry the same logo and branding as larger planes, which make them look to passengers like they are on a Continental plane or a United plane. After all, in many cases the tickets were purchased from the Continental or United websites. But often a small notation indicates otherwise: “Flight operated by Comair” or “Operated by EV.”

Even if you’ve noticed such notations, you may not realize that the flagship carrier has no responsibility for your flight, not when it comes to safety, crew training and especially not when it comes to damages in a lawsuit resulting from a crash.

Former CNN science correspondent Miles O’Brien teamed with “Frontline” producer Rick Young for PBS’s “Frontline: Flying Cheap” (9 tonight, WQED), an excellent, in-depth look at the complicated American aviation system on the one-year anniversary of the crash of Continental Flight 3407 outside Buffalo, N.Y.

“Flying Cheap” uses the Buffalo crash as a jumping off point but traces the history of regional carriers like Colgan Air, the company responsible for Flight 3407. The program shows how deregulation gave rise to these cheaper-to-operate alternative carriers that “code share” with the major airlines, allowing for what one industry insider calls “a seamless travel experience.”

But this system also glosses over the qualitative differences between regional carriers and major airlines, which have higher standards for pilot experience. The program also shows the economic and fatigue factors facing regional carrier pilots, some of whom make less than $22,000 per year. A former Colgan pilot says he was upgraded from first officer to captain in nine months — on a major airline, that can take more than seven years.

Mr. O’Brien and Mr. Young interview one regional pilot who was asked by his Colgan bosses to fly a new type of plane he was not qualified to fly. Another pilot recounts a captain he flew with who falsified flight records. When the first officer filed a complaint, the captain’s license was revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration, but Colgan executives defended the captain.

“They said safety was a priority a lot,” says former Colgan pilot Chris Wiken. “In my experience, however, on a day-to-day basis, being on time and completing the flight was much more important.”

“Flying Cheap” is a must-see hour of television for anyone who flies regularly or has concerns about airline safety.

TV editor Rob Owen: rowen@post-gazette.com or 412-263-1112.

TV preview: Hank Stuever on ‘Frontline: Flying Cheap’

TV preview: Hank Stuever on ‘Frontline: Flying Cheap’
By Hank Stuever
Washington Post Staff Writer
February 9, 2010

Anyone who regularly travels to the less glamorous American cities knows what happens after a layover in the hub: Your ticket may say Delta or United or Continental, but that’s not exactly true now, is it? For the last leg, to, say, Wichita, you’re flying Colgan, Pinnacle — who? Hunh?

Buckle up and enjoy a renewed sense of doom from watching — what else? — the always grim but journalistically committed “Frontline.” In Tuesday night’s installment, “Flying Cheap,” producer Rick Young and aviation correspondent Miles O’Brien examine the unsavory business practices and regulation-skirting circumstances that may have led to the crash a year ago of Continental Flight 3407 in Buffalo, which killed 50 people. The flying had been outsourced to Manassas-based Colgan Air. (Results of a National Transportation Safety Board investigation last week blamed pilot error in the crash.)

“Frontline” almost never fails to make its case, but it seems fairly easy to make here, through interviews with former pilots, Federal Aviation Administration investigators and grieving relatives of those who died on Flight 3407. Cockpit transcripts reveal two underpaid, unexperienced pilots yawning and complaining about their grueling commutes. They lost control of their plane just a month after the nation had been celebrating the cool, experienced reserve shown by Chesley Sullenberger, who successfully landed his disabled US Airways jetliner in the Hudson River with no casualties. The difference? A captain like Sully is expensive.

That cheap ticket you found online is the byproduct of deregulation in the extreme, which allows major carriers to transfer to smaller carriers the high-cost (and all liabilities) of what once might have been a costlier, premium flight. According to “Frontline,” half of all domestic flights are now handled by smaller carriers, no matter what the brand-name logo on the plane’s tail might suggest. And, as it happens, the last six fatal crashes in the United States involved commuter flights.

For these carriers to turn a profit, “Frontline” reports, rookie pilots are pushed into the captain’s (or first officer’s) seats, and poorly paid. Although this isn’t exactly news, “Flying Cheap’s” most fascinating moments are when the cameras accompany an unidentified group of pilots into their “crash pad” — a two-bedroom, airport-proximate apartment in an unnamed Northeastern city where as many as a dozen pilots split the rent. Forced to commute cross-country and then fly, some earn as little as $16,000 a year to start.

“Flying Cheap” is full of common sense and outrage — and, of course, requisite cost-cutting bad guys. A regional airline industry rep, for example, wants us to believe that the solution to overly tired, underpaid pilots is as simple as a $50 motel room in Newark.

“Frontline” finds considerable fault with federal oversight, unsheathing the highlighter on the usual reams of reports. But it seems like there’s another, less examined culprit here — the American consumer, who has come to expect the best of service but the lowest of fares. That would be the business people jetting off to can’t-miss meetings and conferences, as well as the obsessed grandparents who need to be present for every toddler’s birthday. We are a nation addicted to cheap flying.

So the lower altitudes, the turbulence, the pilots dozing at the controls of twin props? That antsy, grip-the-armrest feeling? Maybe you’re getting exactly what you’ve paid for.

Frontline: Flying Cheap

(one hour) airs Tuesday at 10 p.m. on WETA.

Southwest facing FAA safety investigation

Southwest facing FAA safety investigation
By DAVE MICHAELS / The Dallas Morning News
dmichaels@dallasnews.com
February 9, 2010

WASHINGTON – The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating violations of safety directives by Southwest Airlines, the third such probe of the Dallas-based carrier’s maintenance record in two years.

The investigation, confirmed by an FAA spokesman, focuses on an issue that embarrassed the airline just two years ago: how it complies with safety directives governing the maintenance of aging aircraft. It also resembles a case from last year, when the FAA found that a Southwest maintenance contractor used unapproved parts on 82 planes.

In the latest case, FAA inspectors think Southwest and a Seattle-area repair station failed to follow federally approved procedures when they carried out repair work on sections of the fuselage.

Under federal guidelines for calculating civil penalties, the FAA could propose a fine in the tens of millions of dollars because 44 planes flew more than 100,000 flights while out of compliance, according to one official with knowledge of the investigation.

The case, which has been conducted by inspectors in the FAA’s Seattle office, hasn’t been reviewed by top FAA lawyers in Washington, so it’s unclear what penalty the FAA may eventually propose.

“The cases are open but are still under investigation,” said Lynn Lunsford, an FAA spokesman in Fort Worth. “So we can’t get into details about them.”

A Southwest spokeswoman declined to comment on the investigation but said that safety remains the airline’s primary focus.

“All of our maintenance operations promote aviation safety by working in coordination with the FAA, equipment manufacturers and aircraft maintenance organizations in every effort to ensure that our fleet is maintained in accordance with applicable regulations and is aligned with best practice in the industry,” said Southwest’s Beth Harbin.

Federal regulators have taken a stricter view of federal airworthiness regulations since a 2008 congressional investigation brought to light allegations that some FAA officials in North Texas became cozy with carriers like Southwest.

In the past two years, the FAA has leveled multimillion-dollar fines against Southwest, Fort Worth-based American Airlines, US Airways and United Airlines over noncompliance with safety directives or the carriers’ own maintenance procedures.

The latest Southwest case appears more complicated than the violations for which it was punished in 2008, when the carrier was found to have operated six jets with cracks in their fuselage. The case against the carrier for using unapproved parts remains open.

FAA inspectors first discovered the latest problems on one jet – which was grounded for several days in mid-September – during routine surveillance of the repair station in Everett, Wash. They later found 43 other jets that flew more than 100,000 trips over several years while out of compliance.

The case turns on the way work was performed by Aviation Technical Services, the contractor in Everett. ATS was charged with replacing skin panels in order to satisfy safety directives that required repetitive inspections of Southwest’s Boeing 737s.

But ATS decided that it could not perform the work as prescribed and suggested its own workaround to Southwest. Southwest approved that solution but failed to inform the FAA about it.

Because the work deviated from federally approved procedures, Southwest should have sought a clearance known as an alternate means of compliance, according to the official, who declined to be named because such cases are rarely discussed before penalties are announced.

Part of the work involved a process known as shoring, which is how mechanics secure the aircraft frame while skin panels are changed. In addition, the inspectors found that ATS’ mechanics didn’t always apply rivets to refasten the skin panels within the 20 hours prescribed by Boeing, the plane manufacturer. The rivets must be applied in that timeframe to ensure that sealant doesn’t leak out, creating a gap between the skin and the frame of the airplane.

In the worst-case scenario, faulty work could lead to metal fatigue, corrosion or other deterioration of the aircraft’s skin. Even tiny cracks in a jet’s skin can expand as the plane’s fuselage expands and contracts during thousands of pressurization cycles.

Under federal regulations, an airline is ultimately responsible for flying planes deemed not airworthy, even if maintenance is performed by a contractor. Southwest obtained retroactive approval for ATS’ work in late September, which allowed the carrier to continue flying the jets.

Southwest was formally notified of the investigation in April. At a meeting shortly thereafter, Southwest and ATS quality-assurance officials were presented with the FAA’s findings. One of the officials at the meeting was Peggy Hain, whose position at Southwest was created as a condition of reducing a previous hefty fine leveled against the carrier. Hain previously worked as director of maintenance at ATS.

“It was business as usual,” the official said about the carrier’s response after the meeting. “They didn’t take any corrective actions.”

Agencies to Fault American on Maintenance

Agencies to Fault American on Maintenance
By Andy Pasztor
Wall Street Journal
February 8, 2010

American Airlines is about to come under sharp criticism from two separate federal agencies accusing it of serious maintenance lapses, according to government and industry officials familiar with the details.

In the next few days, these officials said, the Department of Transportation’s inspector general is slated to release a report outlining apparent failures by the AMR Corp. unit to identify and promptly resolve aircraft-maintenance problems in 2008. The alleged deficiencies range from multiple faulty repairs of engine-start systems to repeated deferrals of other repairs, as well as mechanics signing off on work without the necessary authority.

Separately, senior Federal Aviation Administration officials are close to proposing a civil penalty against American, wrapping up an enforcement case stemming from different maintenance lapses dating back to roughly the same period. The penalty is likely to be the largest the agency has levied against an airline, the officials said.

American spokesman Tim Wagner said, “It would be inappropriate for American to comment” until the report’s release. “We have cooperated fully with the DOT’s review, and our responses are included in the report,” he said. He declined to discuss any possible FAA action.

The proposed American penalty, government and industry officials said, is likely to top $10 million, and could be as much as $20 million, unless the agency changes course. It stems from repairs alleged to have been performed improperly on wiring near the landing gears of American’s McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft. In April 2008, those problems forced the temporary grounding of American’s entire MD-80 fleet, causing flight cancellations affecting more than 300,000 passengers.

A spokesman for the DOT’s inspector general and spokeswoman for the FAA declined to comment. But FAA officials have indicated the agency and the airline have taken steps to resolve many of the issues covered by the inspector general’s report.

No final decision has been made on the size of the penalty, and no specific figure has been communicated to the airline, the officials said. In 2008, the FAA proposed what would have been a record penalty of $10.2 million against Southwest Airlines Co., but it was later negotiated down to $7.5 million.

In the past, American officials have said the MD-80 wiring issues didn’t pose an imminent safety hazard, and some have signaled the company most likely would challenge a large fine.

Industry officials said outside consultants, brought in after American’s MD-80 wiring snafus, found that a shortage of maintenance supervisors at American, vaguely worded engineering orders and the tendency of some line mechanics to improvise on certain repairs contributed to the problem.

Since then, American has sharply increased the number of employees monitoring maintenance trends and changes in the reliability of aircraft systems. The FAA, meanwhile, has improved its capabilities to track deferred maintenance tasks and determine when to order corrective actions.

American’s mechanics union said it has “worked closely with the company to pinpoint maintenance problems and correct them.” John Conley, a senior official of the Transport Workers Union, said in a statement that “most of what is included in the [inspector general's] report are issues that have already been addressed.”

Taken together, the government’s expected actions reflect closer scrutiny of maintenance operations at the country’s No. 2 carrier by passenger traffic, as well as the difficulty of resolving aircraft-maintenance disputes without prolonged wrangling.

But while the inspector general’s audit is critical of what it indicates were lapses by the airline, it primarily faults the FAA for lax oversight of American’s maintenance practices, government and industry officials said. The audit alleges that the FAA failed to keep close track of safety and reliability trends at the airline.

The auditors also criticize the FAA for failing to appropriately monitor repeated failures of forward landing gears on American’s MD-80 jets. In addition, they criticized the FAA for its delay in issuing safety directives for potentially dangerous windshield heaters.

Officials said the inspector general’s office is expected to urge the FAA to step up verification of American’s maintenance work, instead of relying on agency inspectors’ reviews of the carrier’s records. The report also is expected to call for high-level FAA reviews of whether the agency’s weaknesses are systemic or limited to the office that keeps tabs on American.

The inspector general’s audit was prompted by safety complaints from American’s pilots union, which remains locked in bitter labor negotiations with the carrier. The document, among other things, identifies engineering and process failures related to delays in changing out suspect parts that could cause short circuits, smoke and cracks in cockpit windshields on Boeing 757s and other models.

Senior managers at American, which performs more repairs in-house than any other large U.S. airline, have been aware of nagging maintenance difficulties for years, industry officials said. They said that even though American’s internal safety-oversight system flagged substandard repairs early on, airline management failed to understand or promptly act on such warnings.

In recent years, American has tangled with FAA inspectors and government crash investigators over various maintenance matters, some outside the scope of the inspector general’s audit and the pending FAA enforcement case. Congressional investigators also have been looking into some of the same issues.

In September 2007, the National Transportation Safety Board criticized years of delays by the FAA and industry in replacing potentially hazardous cockpit windshields. The FAA eventually issued a series of safety directives calling for stepped-up inspections of windshields on Boeing 747, 757, 767 and 777 aircraft, and is now expected to issue still another directive dealing with the dangers of smoke or fire. American voluntarily began replacing suspect windshields some time ago, but late last year company officials said the process was only about half finished.

According to Boeing Co., which issued its last maintenance bulletin on this topic two years ago, there have been 29 incidents of windshield smoke or fire on Boeing aircraft since the beginning of 2001.

In August 2008, the FAA proposed a $7.1 million penalty against American for allegedly violating employee drug- and alcohol-testing procedures and knowingly flying airplanes that violated maintenance regulations.

In May 2009, federal crash investigators said American’s faulty maintenance, combined with a deficient internal safety-oversight system, contributed to an engine failure and subsequent fire on an MD-80 plane shortly after takeoff from St. Louis two years earlier. Despite hydraulic and electrical malfunctions, the crippled twin-engine jet managed to return safely to the airport.

But the safety board faulted both American and the FAA for failing to realize, prior to the crash, the significance of certain maintenance data. Mechanics had repeatedly swapped out start valves on the same engine that quit leaving St Louis. Mechanics ended up replacing valves six separate times during a 12-day period leading up to the enmergency, but still failed to get to the bottom of the problem

Last summer, FAA inspectors launched an investigation to determine whether American failed to properly alert them about potential safety problems stemming from scratches on the aluminum skins of some Boeing 737 jets. The planes were damaged from contact with certain types of passenger bridges, or jetways, used at airports nationwide.

Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com

Contrasting Statements: Complacency Versus Frustration

Contrasting Statements: Complacency Versus Frustration
Nolan Law Group
By David Evans
February 5, 2010

Between 2 and 4 February, an enormous gap appeared between talk and action about much-needed safety belt-tightening. On the side of complacency was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which issued a one-paragraph statement at the 2 February hearing by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) into the fatal crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 (operating as Continental Express), a Dash 8-Q400 twin turboprop.

The pilots allowed the speed to decay, but that’s the end stage of a series of shortcomings both at Colgan and thoughout the industry.

On the side of frustration was just about everybody else, notably NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman, who issued a ringing statement decrying FAA and airline industry lassitude.

Which side is right? The layman might turn to neutral parties, to include an airline pilot union that does not represent the Colgan Air pilots, and Congress, which has the job of funding the FAA to ensure its adequate oversight of the airlines. What emerges is definitely a contrast between FAA complacency and just about everybody else’s frustration.

To set the stage, here is the brief one-paragraph FAA statement that was distributed at the NTSB’s 2 February hearing:

“In the past year, the FAA has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training, and background checks. We will soon publish proposed federal rules to prevent pilot fatigue and further improve training. Airline passengers deserve an expertly trained and well rested crew, whether they are flying on a major or a regional jet. Pilots must be trained for the mission they are flying and the FAA already is working to further improve their professional qualifications. The FAA will review and evaluate today’s NTSB recommendations to help determine what further action may be needed.”

No fact sheets detailing the FAA’s various actions accompanied this statement. “Soon publish” is somewhat misleading; the FAA originally promised to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in December 2009; it is now promised to appear on the Federal Register some time in April-May. Note also the FAA’s careful wording to “review and evaluate” the roughly 20 recommendations issued at the end of the hearing. How about “adopt and implement”? The FAA words lack commitment.

In sharp contrast, here’s the statement Chairman Hersman verbalized after about 10 hours of detailed presentations and discussion of the many deficiencies (some affecting the entire industry) leading up to the crash:

“I believe that this accident investigation has refocused the FAA’s and the industry’s attention on the many issues that the Board has raised over the last several years: issues like flight crew monitoring, pilot performance, sterile cockpit violations, fatigue, training, record keeping, use of personal electronic devices, and safety alerts. These are critical issues that require attention AND action of the FAA and industry.

“The tragedy in this report is what we uncovered in the investigation [and] we already knew. Many of the issues in this report are not new to the Safety Board.

“We have seen similar issues in other investigations, like the Air Sunshine accident, where the pilot had multiple test failures. This report raises serious questions about the effectiveness and oversight of pilot training. It is disturbing to hear of the numerous times that the captain failed only to be passed along in his c areer. In many respects, this is like a student getting passed from grade to grade, and at the time of graduation, never having truly mastered the subject matter.

“And there are other accidents in which the Board cited pilot professionalism and training:

– In 2004, in Jefferson City, MO, 2 pilots, with no passengers on board, flew a Pinnacle Airlines plane to FL40, mishandled the stall recovery, lost both engines and crashed. The cause: unprofessionalism and lack of airmanship skills, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which the pilots could not recover.

– In 2006, an American Eagle plane experienced a similar stall, this time over California after the crew let the speed of the aircraft decay, and in this case, fortunately, the crew was able to recover. Again, pilot professionalism and training were at issue.

– Pilot fatigue was at issue in several accidents, including Shuttle America in Cleveland, Pinnacle in Traverse City, and Corporate Airlines in Kirksville.

“For years, many of these issues have been highlighted in our safety recommendations – the Safety Board’s own call to action to the FAA and industry. Some have been included on the Safety Board’s Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements.

“The issues we see in this accident are not limited to the regional airline industry, but are occurring in all segments of the [airline] industry. That is why many of our recommendations are addressed to both major carriers and their regional partners.

“In the wake of this tragedy and prompted by issues raised in our public hearing and in hearings by Congress, the FAA responded with its safety call-to-action, a plan that asks the aviation industry – from major carriers, their regional partners, industry groups and labor – to improve safety standards. [See Aviation Safety Journal, ‘Behind an Inflated Percent, Reality’]

“While this [FAA] call to action is an important start, we need fewer listening sessions and more continuous and persistent action if we are serious about crossing the finish line.

“If we want pilots to get more rest, we have to change the hours of service requirements.

“If we want to address change how pilots commute, we have to address commuting.

“If we want pilots to be at the top of their game, we need to adequately train them.

“If we want to raise the bar, we can’t simply require industry to meet a safety ‘floor.’

“And the fact of the matter is, if the FAA and the industry don’t take corrective action, Congress will. Both the House and the Senate are considering bills that impose tough safety standards. Many of the family members here today have been advocating for such measures. In fact, this Thursday [4 February], the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will hold a hearing to examine the FAA’s call to action on airline safety and pilot training.

“Today’s aviation industry is safe. The skies and the airplanes in which we ride are safe. But just because airplanes are safe and the industry is complying with FAA regulations does not mean that we are doing enough. The absolute minimum cannot be our finish line. That’s why the Safety Board’s work on these issues does not end with this report.

“Through this investigation and report, our accident investigators sifted through a lot of information. Each piece of information was carefully examined and a determination of whether that piece of information led to the probable cause of this accident. In the coming months, the Safety Board will dig deeper into those issues – like code sharing, and pilot and controller excellence. Those issues are bigger than this accident, with far-reaching implications for the aviation industry.

“If there is one thing we take away from this accident, it is that history repeats itself. We must take swift and effective action on these recommendations. If the aviation community does not take them to heart, then we are destined to revisit them again. It should not take another 50 lives to gather the sense of urgency and the will to do it.”

Basically, Hersman issued 18 paragraphs of specifics to the FAA’s one paragraph of generalized blandishments. Is she right? Here’s what one pilots union, the Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA), had to say in a statement handed out at the NTSB hearing. Since CAPA does not represent Colgan Air pilots, consider its statement as being from a neutral source:

“CAPA calls for immediate action to address serious safety concerns including pilot fatigue, pilot training, and inadequate pilot experience, all of which were cited as contributing factors to the crash in Buffalo that killed 50 innocent people. CAPA has been advocating for these necessary changes in regulations long before this tragedy occurred.

“The FAA has been woefully unresponsive with needed regulatory change. Thirty years after the Air Florida crash in Washington, DC, nothing has been done to address aircraft anti-ice and de-icing training. Twenty years after the NTSB placed ‘pilot fatigue’ on its Most Wanted list, nothing has been done. And recently, FAA Administrator Babbitt postponed, yet again, the release of its NPRM [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] on fatigue, originally promised prior to the end of 2009. This lack of response is due to the FAA’s inability to separate special interests from the need to reform flight safety issues.

“The serious deterioration of pilot hiring qualifications in jet transport aircraft has been apparent within the airline industry for many years. Yet, it took the tragic crash of Continental [Express] 3407 to awaken the FAA to this glaring issue. The professional airline pilots at CAPA feel that the FAA’s proposed solutions as outlined in last week’s ‘Call to Action Report’ are seriously deficient. CAPA believes that this latest NTSB report will also go unheeded, and yet again nothing of substance will be done to address the safety issues that were identified days after the fatal crash of flight 3407.

“ ‘The FAA Administrator’s clearly stated intent to accept this current degradation in pilot experience and turn our airlines’ cockpits into an ‘on the job training’ environment is in clear opposition to 20 years of industry progress in Crew Resource and Cockpit Safety Management Programs,’ said CAPA President Paul Onorato.

“Absent a constructive response from the FAA, it falls upon Congress to immediately legislate the necessary changes needed to ensure the safety of the traveling public. CAPA supports efforts in both the House and Senate to promote critically needed legislation to restore confidence in our nation’s air transportation system.”

Two days after the NTSB hearing, a House subcommittee held a hearing to assess the FAA’s actions in the aftermath of the Colgan Air tragedy. Rep. Jerry Costello (D-IL), Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee had this to say:

“My concern is not simply that the FAA is a few months behind on any one rule. I am concerned that these delays stem from historic patterns of industry opposition to any form of regulation, and that key safety reforms have not been implemented nearly a year after 50 people died on Flight 3407, despite promises of swift action from the FAA.”

Inspector general faults FAA actions since Flight 3407 crash

Inspector general faults FAA actions since Flight 3407 crash
By Jerry Zremski
The Buffalo News
Updated: February 04, 2010, 11:47 pm
Published: February 04, 2010, 10:55 am

WASHINGTON — Government inspectors Thursday harshly criticized the Federal Aviation Administration for its response to the Colgan Air crash in Clarence center a year ago, saying the agency’s effort to get airlines to voluntarily fix safety problems had not addressed the problems the accident raised.

Of the FAA’s 10 initiatives tied to the FAA’s voluntary “Call to Action” effort, eight are either falling behind schedule or not meeting their intended goals, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s inspector general said.

Most importantly, the FAA has fallen behind in developing tougher rules on on pilot training and fatigue, and has inadequately reviewed training programs at the airlines.

“FAA also has not followed up to ensure air carriers’ Call to Action commitments effectively meet planned safety goals,” Calvin L. Scovel III, inspector general of the U.S. Department of Transportation, said in prepared testimony for a House hearing this morning.

“Other critical issues emerged after the Colgan accident that remain unaddressed, such as potential correlations between pilot experience and compensation,” Scovel added.

Colgan Air operated the flight for Continental that crashed Feb. 12. The agency did special investigations of the airlines’ pilot training programs as part of the Call to Action, but Scovel’s agency found that the inspections were ineffectively designed and implemented.

“More importantly, the [inspector general] review identified more than 20 air carriers that had not fully implemented remedial training programs as previously recommended by FAA in 2006,” Scovel said in his prepared remarks.

Scovel released his conclusions at a hearing of the House Aviation Subcommittee, where FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt defended his agency’s effort, which it detailed in a report released last week.

Babbitt said the agency should be given credit for prodding all the nation’s airlines into enlisting in a voluntary safety program that many had previously shunned.

“I am concerned that no one is taking into account the benefits in our final report that we have achieved,” Babbitt said.

In addition, the FAA announced today that it is giving the public 60 days to comment on a new set of pilot training rules the agency intends to draw up. Those rules would be in addition to another training proposal that the agency proposed 13 months ago but that is being redrawn amid airline industry opposition.

The document announcing the coming rulemaking process suggested the agency would consider boosting the number of flight hours required by new co-pilots to 750, up from 250 today.

But the announcement was posed not as a definitive proposal, but as a series of discussion items addressing questions such as:

• Whether co-pilots as well as pilots should be required to hold an Air Transport Pilot certificate, which requires them to have 1,500 hours of flying experience. That requirement is a key goal of the Families of Continental Flight 3407.
• Whether academic credit should be accepted in lieu of some of those hours.
• Whether the FAA should establish a new type of license short of the ATP certification, which will nonetheless address concerns about the fact that co-pilots are currently required to have only 250 hours of flying experience.
• Whether safety could be boosted by addressing pilot certification issues on an airline-by-airline basis.

Today’s hearing came two days after the National Transportation Safety Board released its final report in the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407 in Clarence Center last February, which Colgan operated. Fifty people died in the accident

The report cited pilot error as the probable cause of the crash, but the safety agency also released 25 safety recommendations, many focusing on pilot training.

Opposing view: FAA puts safety first

Opposing view: FAA puts safety first
Fines are just one of many tools we use to ensure compliance.
By Randy Babbitt

Since 2003, more than 73 million airplanes have flown safely in the United States. We are proud of that safety record, but we will not stop working.

Airline passengers deserve an expertly trained and well rested crew, whether they are flying on a major airline or a regional carrier. In the past year, we’ve made significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training, and background checks. The Federal Aviation Administration is proposing new rules to prevent pilot fatigue, improve pilot training and upgrade pilot qualifications.

Airline passengers also deserve to feel confident in airline maintenance work when they board an airplane. USA TODAY’s assertion that shoddy maintenance work is widespread in the airline industry is inaccurate. USA TODAY’s tally of maintenance violations based on FAA fines is not a meaningful measure of safety.

Fines are just one of the many tools the FAA uses to ensure compliance. If an airplane is found to be unsafe to fly, the FAA can and will keep it on the ground, and we will levy fines and increase scrutiny of any airline that is out of compliance. Every FAA fine is accompanied by corrective action from the airline, or else the FAA will take further actions. That’s what produces a safer system.

The FAA has more information from airlines, pilots and aircraft recorders than we have ever had before. These tools enable our safety inspectors to better analyze data, spot safety trends, and prioritize risks before accidents happen.

Both foreign and domestic repair stations are subject to rigorous scrutiny. Domestically, the average repair station undergoes more than 30 audits a year by the FAA and aircraft operators. Foreign repair stations are audited not only by the FAA and aircraft operators, but also by international civil aviation authorities. These stations must renew their FAA certificate every 12 to 24 months, and if our standards are not met, the certificate is not approved.

The FAA is making the right safety investments, and I will continue to push us all toward even higher standards.

Randy Babbitt is administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

Colgan role in tragedy gets further scrutiny

Colgan role in tragedy gets further scrutiny
Narrow focus on pilots is called into question
By Jerry Zremski
The Buffalo News
Updated: February 04, 2010, 7:17 am /
Published: February 04, 2010, 7:01 am

WASHINGTON — The Families of Continental Flight 3407 hopes that the conclusions reached by the federal crash investigation will help the group in its fight for greater aviation safety — but airline pilots are not so sure.

The discussion at Tuesday’s National Transportation Safety Board meeting to release the report dwelt on the pilots of the plane that crashed in Clarence Center last Feb. 12, killing 50 people.

Much was made of the pilots’ mistakes, and comparatively little was said about Colgan Air, the subcontractor that hired and trained the crew for the Continental Connection flight.

Kevin Kuwik, boyfriend of Flight 3407 victim Lorin Maurer and a key member of the families group, said he understands perfectly well why that was, given the errors the crew made. And he noted that Colgan’s “inadequate procedures” for setting the airspeed in icing conditions was listed as a contributing factor to the crash.

“You shouldn’t have an accident where the report says the airline dropped the ball,” Kuwik said.

But Capt. John H. Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, sharply criticized the report for focusing so narrowly on the crew.

“Creating a safer industry means looking at all the reasons why this tragedy occurred and taking aggressive action to ensure nothing similar happens again,” Prater said. “The single, narrow focus of the probable-cause statement issued [by the safety board] is an unfortunate move backward away from that goal.”

The safety board said the probable cause of the crash was Capt. Marvin D. Renslow’s inappropriate response to the “stick shaker,” part of the plane’s stall-warning and -recovery systems. Renslow repeatedly pulled back on the controls, fighting the system that would have automatically worked to pull the plane out of an aerodynamic stall.

In addition to citing Colgan’s procedures as a contributing factor to the crash, the safety board listed Renslow’s poor management of the flight and the fact that he and co-pilot Rebecca L. Shaw failed to notice that they had allowed the plane to fly dangerously slow.

Prater noted that during the meeting, the board discussed the need to improve training and cockpit displays, enhance oversight and provide better weather information to crews.

The board issued safety recommendations addressing those concerns, which left Prater perplexed about how it could omit them from its finding on probable cause.

“Creating a safer industry means looking at all the reasons why this tragedy occurred and taking aggressive action to ensure nothing similar happens again,” Prater said.

Yet Prater and other union officials were among the few to criticize the safety board in the wake of the release of the report and the accompanying safety recommendations.

Lawmakers said they thought the safety board effort could help in pushing aviation safety measures through Congress.

“The NTSB hearing brought to light significant deficiencies in both Colgan Air’s procedures and the pilots’ training, and it has only strengthened our resolve to get our legislation improving and increasing pilot experience passed into law,” said Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y.

Colgan downplayed the fact that the safety board criticized the airline for never giving Renslow simulator training on the stick pusher — which is supposed to automatically save the plane from a stall — in the plane he was flying.

According to the airline, Renslow had received adequate training.

“By all accounts, Capt. Renslow and First Officer Shaw were fine people,” Colgan said in a statement. “But they knew what to do in the situation they faced that night a year ago, had repeatedly demonstrated they knew what to do, and yet did not do it. We cannot speculate on why they did not use their training in dealing with the situation they faced.”

Since the crash, Colgan has added the proper use of the stick pusher to its pilot-training program. In addition, the airline has tightened its hiring procedures to make sure that it is hiring more experienced aviators.

“Recently, Colgan Air has worked together with its pilots to address safety issues and capitalize on safety-reporting programs as a way to identify and solve issues before accidents or incidents occur,” said Capt. Mark Segaloff, chairman of the Colgan pilots union. “We are seeing signs of progress.”

Instead of continually finding fault with Colgan, some members of the families group set their sights on the Federal Aviation Administration, which had ignored previous safety board recommendations aimed at bolstering pilot training — a criticism also voiced by safety board Chairwoman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

The FAA has contended that it has dramatically bolstered air safety by getting airlines to agree to voluntary measures in its “Call to Action,” a report released last week that is the subject of a House Aviation subcommittee hearing thutoday. However, Scott Maurer, father of Lorin Maurer, dismissed “Call to Action” as “that 200-page piece of lip service.”

Told that the families were increasingly critical of FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt in the wake of delays in new regulations on pilot training and fatigue, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said: “Nobody cares more about safety than Randy Babbitt.”

LaHood noted that the FAA held 12 safety summits across the country after the crash and did what it could unilaterally to address the issues raised by the Flight 3407 tragedy. But issuing new regulations takes time, LaHood said, because “you’ve got to give all the stakeholders a chance to respond to these things.”

But some lawmakers, too, sound as if they are getting tired of the delays.

Asked for his reaction to the safety board meeting, Rep. Chris Lee, R-Clarence, said: “I hope it just leads to action. For every day that passes without action, there’s the opportunity for some other sort of tragedy to occur.”

Plane makes emergency landing near Texas 130

Plane makes emergency landing near Texas 130
Instructor took over controls after engine problems, officials say.

AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Updated: 2:05 a.m. Thursday, Feb. 4, 2010
Published: 9:36 p.m. Wednesday, Feb. 3, 2010

A flight instructor safely landed a single-engine Cherokee-type general aviation aircraft in a field near the Texas 130 toll road and FM 812 on Wednesday afternoon after it had developed engine problems, Department of Public Safety officials said. No one was injured.

DPS Sgt. Kelly Wilkison said student pilot Jeff Alino was flying north when the engine on the plane failed, at which point instructor Jerry White took over and landed the plane in the field about three miles south of Austin-Bergstrom International Airport. “We’re happy we’re alive,” Alino said. “Happy to be safe.”

White said his daughter slept through the entire landing in the backseat. “These airplanes are quite safe,” he said. “We went through emergency procedures and landed it safely.”

Alino was taking flight lessons from White, who operates out of Pilot’s Choice in Georgetown, officials said.

Progress and Challenges With FAA’s Call to Action for Airline Safety

Progress and Challenges With FAA\’s Call to Action for Airline Safety, testimony by The Honorable Calvin L. Scovell III, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation
Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation United States House of Representatives
February 4, 2010

Click on the link above to read the testimony.

Statement of J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator

Statement of J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator
Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Update: The Agency’s Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training
February 4, 2010

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. There is no question that the FAA’s job is to ensure that we have the safest aviation system in the world. The aviation safety record in the United States reflects the dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including the FAA’s inspector workforce. In an agency dedicated to aviation safety, any failure in the system, especially one that causes loss of life, is keenly felt. When accidents do happen, they reveal risks, including the tragic Colgan Air accident. Consequently, it is incumbent on all parties in the system to identify the risks in order to eliminate or mitigate them. As I noted when I appeared before you in September, history has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed upon solutions. The fastest way to implement a solution is for it to be done voluntarily, and that is what the Call to Action was intended to facilitate. On January 27, the FAA issued a report that describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the Call to Action, and offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation safety. So, I would like to run down the issues I identified in September and let you know where we stand on them.

Pilot Flight Time, Rest and Fatigue: When I was last here I told you that the aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) I convened for the purpose of making recommendations on flight time, rest and fatigue, consisting of representatives from the FAA, industry and labor organizations, provided me with recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management in early September. While I was extremely pleased with the product provided to me, the ARC did not reach a consensus agreement on all areas and was not charged with doing any type of economic analysis. Consequently, in spite of my direction for a very aggressive timeline in which to develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), my hope that a rulemaking proposal could have been issued by the end of last year did not happen. The complexities involved with these issues are part of the reason why the FAA has struggled to finalize proposed regulations on fatigue and duty time that were issued in the mid-1990s. However, with my continued emphasis on this topic, we hope to issue an NPRM this spring. Although this is slightly later that I originally hoped, it is still an extremely expedited schedule and I can assure you the FAA team working on this is committed to meeting the target.

One of the issues contributing to fatigue that I know is of interest to many Members of Congress is that of pilots who commute by air to their job. I would like to acknowledge some of the emails and letters I have been receiving on the issue of commuting from pilots who choose to commute by air to their job. As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. I understand that, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on. So I want to emphasize these issues are complex and, depending on how they are addressed, could have significant impacts on people’s lives.

Focused Inspection Initiative: From June 24, 2009 to September 30, 2009, FAA inspectors conducted a two-part, focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices. The FAA inspected 85 air carriers to determine if they had systems to provide remedial training for pilots. The FAA did not inspect the 14 carriers that have FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP) because AQP includes such a system. Seventy-six air carriers, including AQP carriers, have systems to comply with remedial training requirements. An additional 15 air carriers had some part of a remedial training system. There were eight air carriers that lacked any component of a remedial training program that received additional scrutiny and have since instituted some component of a remedial training system. Consequently, currently all carriers have some component of a remedial training program. The FAA inspectors observed 2,419 training and checking events during its evaluation.

Training Program Review Guidance: The FAA issued a rulemaking proposal in January 2009 to enhance training programs by requiring the use of simulation devices for pilots. More than 3,000 pages of comments were received. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued in the coming months to allow the public to comment on the revisions that were made based on the comments that were submitted.

Based on the information from last summer’s inspections, the FAA is drafting a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) with guidance material on how to conduct a comprehensive training program review in the context of a safety management system (SMS). A complementary Notice to FAA inspectors will provide guidance on how to conduct surveillance. SMS aims to integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable, proactive systems. SMS programs emphasize safety management as a fundamental business process in the same manner as other aspects of business management. Now that we have completed our data evaluation, we are on track to meet our goal of having both guidance documents ready for internal coordination by the end of February.

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at the Call to Action, I sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards. Many airlines are now taking steps to ensure that their smaller partner airlines adopt the larger airline’s most effective safety practices. The Air Transport Association’s Safety Council is now including safety directors from the National Air Carrier Association and the Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. The agency is encouraging periodic meetings of the larger airlines and those with whom they have contract agreements with to review flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) data and to emphasize a shared safety philosophy. I am pleased to report that all 33 carriers we asked to make this commitment have either held or plan to hold meetings with their contract partner airlines.

In addition I am pleased to say that since July 2009, after the Call to Action, the FAA approved 11 new FOQA programs, with another application pending. Also, as of last July, there were only three air carriers that had no ASAP program for any employee group. Those three carriers have now established ASAP programs. Four more air carriers have established new ASAP programs for additional employee groups. All of this supports the contention that the Call to Action did make a difference.

Professionalism and Mentoring: In February, the FAA will host a forum for labor organizations to further develop and improve professionalism and transfer of pilot experience. In the interim, these organizations have answered the Call to Action and support the establishment or professional standards and ethics committees, a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings between the FAA and major and regional air carriers. I very much believe that the transfer of pilot experience is an important way to raise professional standards and improve cockpit discipline. We plan to ask pilot employee organizations to further explore some of the ideas raised in initial discussions, such as establishing joint strategic councils within a “family of carriers.” This approach could lead to individual, as well as corporate mentoring relationships. The use of professional standards committee safety conferences could provide opportunities for two-way mentoring–an important reminder that good ideas are not unique to larger, mainline carriers. Another concept to explore is mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs.

Crew Training Requirements: One of the things that the Call Action has shone a light on is the issue of varying pilot experience. I am attempting to address this issue with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in which we can consider possible alternative requirements, such as an endorsement on a commercial license to indicate specific qualifications. I know some people are suggesting that simply increasing the minimum number of hours required for a pilot to fly in commercial aviation is appropriate. As I have stated repeatedly, I do not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations. The ANPRM will request public comment on other options. For example, a newly-certificated commercial pilot might be limited to certain activities until he or she could accumulate the type of experience deemed potentially necessary to serve as a first officer for an air carrier. We are looking at ways to enhance the existing process for pilot certification to identify discrete areas where an individual pilot receives and successfully completes training, thus establishing operational experience in areas such as the multi-pilot environment, exposure to icing, high altitude operations and other areas common to commercial air carrier operations. We view this option as being more targeted than merely increasing the number of total flight hours required, because it will be obvious to the carrier what skills an individual pilot has. There is a difference between knowing a pilot has been exposed to all critical situations during training versus assuming that simply flying more hours automatically provides that exposure. I expect the ANPRM to be posted on the Federal Register’s website today.

On a related note, a former military pilot wrote a letter to the Washington Post in December on this issue. In his letter, this pilot describes his military training and how, after only 162 flight hours, he was landing his plane on an aircraft carrier. While this is certainly an extreme example, his point is valid. Based on his training and experience, his qualifications at 1,500 hours were significantly different than a pilot who received a non-military, more traditional training experience. This type of difference should be factored in to any regulatory training modification.

Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends its guidance to airlines, I have asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. The airlines agreed to use this best practice for pilot record checks to allow for a more expansive review of records created over the course a pilot’s career. The expanded review would include all the records the FAA maintains on pilots in addition to the records airlines already receive from past employers. Of the 80 air carriers that responded to the FAA on this issue, 53 air carriers, or 66%, reported that they already require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15% reported that they plan to implement the same policy.

As I stated when I appeared before you in September, and as I have stated repeatedly in my conversations, both public and private, the core of many of the issues facing the air carrier industry today is professionalism. It is the duty of the flight crew to arrive for work rested and ready to perform their jobs, regardless of whether they live down the street from the airport or a thousand miles away. Professionalism is not something we can regulate, but it is something we can encourage and urge pilots and flight crews to aspire to. I think the conversations we have been having, in part because of the Call to Action, are helpful in emphasizing the importance of professionalism in aviation safety.

In conclusion, I want to say that while the Call to Action initiatives have been a major focus for me since joining the safety professionals at the FAA, their impressive work has been ongoing for years. Their work has resulted in eliminating fuel tank flammability, virtually eliminating commercial icing accidents, and drastically reducing the number of general aviation accidents in the state of Alaska, among many other things. Safety is at the core of the FAA’s mission and we will always strive to make a safe system safer. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

###

FAA Seeks Public Comment on Pilot Certification

For Immediate Release
February 4, 2010
Contact: Alison Duquette or Les Dorr
Phone: (202) 267-3883

FAA Seeks Public Comment on Pilot Certification

WASHINGTON, D.C. — As part of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Call to Action to enhance airline safety following last year’s Colgan Air accident in Buffalo, NY, the FAA today asked for recommendations to improve pilot qualification and training requirements.

“Our nation’s airlines should have the best-trained and best-prepared pilots in the cockpit,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We must build on the current pilot certification system and make it even stronger.”

“Experience is not measured by flight time alone,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Pilots need to have quality training and experience appropriate to the mission to be ready to handle any situation they encounter.”

The public will have 60 days to comment on basic pilot certification in four key areas:

• Should all pilots who transport passengers be required to hold an Air Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with the appropriate aircraft category, class and type ratings, which would raise the required flight hours for these pilots to 1,500 hours?
• Should the FAA permit academic credit in lieu of required flight hours or experience?
• Should the FAA establish a new commercial pilot certificate endorsement that would address concerns about the operational experience of newly hired commercial pilots, require additional flight hours and possibly credit academic training?
• Would an air carrier-specific authorization on an existing pilot certificate improve safety?

The FAA’s Call to Action aims to strengthen pilot hiring, training and performance, as well as combat fatigue and improve professional standards and discipline at all airlines. The FAA is pursuing both rule changes and voluntary safety enhancements. One proposed rule, which will enhance airline pilot training programs, recently received more than 3,000 pages of public comments. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued this spring. FAA will also propose new rules this spring to address pilot fatigue.

The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) will be published next week in the Federal Register and will have a 60-day comment period. It is on display today at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published/. The FAA will then incorporate the comments into a new proposal that will also be published for public comment.

For more information on the FAA’s Call to Action, go to www.faa.gov/factsheets.

###

NTSB Conclusions on the Crash of Colgan 3407

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of February 2, 2010
(Information subject to editing)

Aircraft Accident Report
Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc.,
Operating as Continental Connection Fight 3407
Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ
Clarence Center, New York
February 12, 2009
NTSB/AAR-10-01

This is a synopsis from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 12, 2009, about 2217 eastern standard time, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The flight crew was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations.
2. The airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations.
3. The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures, including no indications of any problems with the airplane’s ice protection system.
4. The air traffic controllers who were responsible for the flight during its approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport performed their duties properly and responded immediately and appropriately to the loss of radio and radar contact with the flight.
5. This accident was not survivable.
6. The captain’s inappropriate aft control column inputs in response to the stick shaker caused the airplane’s wing to stall.
7. The minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane.
8. Explicit cues associated with the impending stick shaker onset, including the decreasing margin between indicated airspeed and the low-speed cue, the airspeed trend vector pointing downward into the low-speed cue, the changing color of the numbers on the airplane’s indicated airspeed display, and the airplane’s excessive nose-up pitch attitude, were presented on the flight instruments with adequate time for the pilots to initiate corrective action, but neither pilot responded to the presence of these cues.
9. The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence, but the first officer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a significant breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
10. The flight crew did not consider the position of the reference speeds switch when the stick shaker activated.
11. The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.
12. The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.
13. It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.
14. No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.
15. Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.
16. The Q400 airspeed indicator lacked low-speed awareness features, such as an amber band above the low-speed cue or airspeed indications that changed to amber as speed decrease toward the low-speed cue, that would have facilitated the flight crew’s detection of the developing low-speed situation.
17. An aural warning in advance of the stick shaker would have provided a redundant cue of the visual indication of the rising low-speed cue and might have elicited a timely response from the pilots before the onset of the stick shaker.
18. The captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight (1) enabled conversation that delayed checklist completion and conflicted with sterile cockpit procedures and (2) created an environment that impeded timely error detection.
19. The monitoring errors made by the accident flight crew demonstrate the continuing need for specific pilot training on active monitoring skills.
20. Colgan Air’s standard operating procedures at the time of the accident did not promote effective monitoring behavior.
21. Specific leadership training for upgrading captains would help standardize and reinforce the critical command authority skills needed by a pilot-in-command during air carrier operations.
22. Because of the continuing number of accidents involving a breakdown of sterile cockpit discipline, collaborative action by the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation industry to promptly address this issue is warranted.
23. The flight crewmembers’ performance during the flight, including the captain’s deviations from standard operating procedures and the first officer’s failure to challenge these deviations, was not consistent with the crew resource management (CRM) training that they had received or the concepts in the Federal Aviation Administration’s CRM guidance.
24. The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined.
25. All pilots, including those who commute to their home base of operations, have a personal responsibility to wisely manage their off-duty time and effectively use available rest periods so that they can arrive for work fit for duty; the accident pilots did not do so by using an inappropriate facility during their last rest period before the accident flight.
26. Colgan Air did not proactively address the pilot fatigue hazards associated with operations at a predominantly commuter base.
27. Operators have a responsibility to identify risks associated with commuting, implement strategies to mitigate these risks, and ensure that their commuting pilots are fit for duty.
28. The first officer’s illness symptoms did not likely affect her performance directly during the flight.
29. The captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career, and his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed.
30. Remedial training and additional oversight for pilots with training deficiencies and failures would help ensure that the pilots have mastered the necessary skills for safe flight.
31. Colgan Air’s electronic pilot training records did not contain sufficient detail for the company or its principal operations inspector to properly analyze the captain’s trend of unsatisfactory performance.
32. Notices of disapproval need to be considered along with other available information about pilot applicants so that air carriers can fully identify those pilots who have a history of unsatisfactory performance.
33. Colgan Air did not use all available sources of information on the flight crew’s qualifications and previous performance to determine the crew’s suitability for work at the company.
34. Colgan Air’s procedures and training at the time of the accident did not specifically require flight crews to cross-check the approach speed bug settings in relation to the reference speeds switch position; such awareness is important because a mismatch between the bugs and the switch could lead to an early stall warning.
35. The current air carrier approach-to-stall training did not fully prepare the flight crew for an unexpected stall in the Q400 and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall.
36. The circumstances of this and other accidents in which pilots have responded incorrectly to the stick pusher demonstrate the continuing need to train pilots on the actions of the stick pusher and the airplane’s initial response to the pusher.
37. Pilots could have a better understanding of an airplane’s flight characteristics during the post-stall flight regime if realistic, fully developed stall models were incorporated into simulators that are approved for such training.
38. The inclusion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration icing video in Colgan Air’s winter operations training may lead pilots to assume that a tailplane stall might be possible in the Q400, resulting in negative training.
39. The current Federal Aviation Administration surveillance standards for oversight at air carriers undergoing rapid growth and increased complexity of operations do not guarantee that any challenges encountered by the carriers as a result of these changes will be appropriately mitigated.
40. Mandatory flight operational quality assurance programs would enhance flight safety because all operators would have readily available data to identify operational risks and use in developing corrective actions.
41. The viability of flight operational quality assurance programs depends on the confidentiality of the data, which would currently not be guaranteed if operators were required to implement these programs and required to share the data with the Federal Aviation Administration.
42. The systematic monitoring of all available safety data, as part of a flight operational quality assurance program, could provide operators with objective information regarding the manner in which flights are conducted, and a periodic review of this information would enhance flight safety by assisting operators in detecting and correcting deviations from standard operating procedures.
43. Distractions caused by personal portable electronic devices affect flight safety because they can detract from a flight crew’s ability to monitor and cross-check instruments, detect hazards, and avoid errors.
44. The current use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information is not effective because oversight and documentation of an operator’s response are not required and critical safety issues may not be effectively addressed.
45. Weather documents missing key weather products or containing products that are no longer valid prevent flight crewmembers from having relevant, readily available weather‑related safety information for preflight and in‑flight decision-making.
46. Detailed icing definitions that include accretion rates and recommended pilot actions would help pilots more accurately determine the icing conditions to report in airframe icing pilot reports and more effectively respond to those conditions.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to review their standard operating procedures to verify that they are consistent with the flight crew monitoring techniques described in Advisory Circular (AC) 120‑71A, “Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers”; if the procedures are found not to be consistent, revise the procedures according to the AC guidance to promote effective monitoring. (A‑10-XX)
2. For all airplanes engaged in commercial operations under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135, and 91K, require the installation of low-airspeed alert systems that provide pilots with redundant aural and visual warnings of an impending hazardous low-speed condition. (Supersedes Safety Recommendations A‑03-53 and ‑54)
3. Require that airspeed indicator display systems on all aircraft certified under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 and equipped with electronic flight instrument systems depict a yellow/amber cautionary band above the low-speed cue or the digits on the airspeed indicator change from white to amber/yellow as the speed approaches the low-speed cue, consistent with Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 25-11A.
4. Issue an advisory circular with guidance on leadership training for upgrading captains at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators, including methods and techniques for effective leadership; professional standards of conduct; strategies for briefing and debriefing; reinforcement and correction skills; and other knowledge, skills, and abilities that are critical for air carrier operations. (A-10-XX)
5. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to provide a specific course on leadership training to their upgrading captains that is consistent with the advisory circular requested in Safety Recommendation [2]. (A‑10‑XX)
6. Develop, and distribute to all pilots, multimedia guidance materials on professionalism in aircraft operations that contain standards of performance for professionalism; best practices for sterile cockpit adherence; techniques for assessing and correcting pilot deviations; examples and scenarios; and a detailed review of accidents involving breakdowns in sterile cockpit and other procedures, including this accident. Obtain the input of operators and air carrier and general aviation pilot groups in the development and distribution of these guidance materials. (A-10-XX) (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A‑07-8)
7. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to address fatigue risks associated with commuting, including identifying pilots who commute, establishing policy and guidance to mitigate fatigue risks for commuting pilots, using scheduling practices to minimize opportunities for fatigue in commuting pilots, and developing or identifying rest facilities for commuting pilots. (A-10-XX)
8. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to document and retain electronic and/or paper records of pilot training and checking events in sufficient detail so that the carrier and its principal operations inspector can fully assess a pilot’s entire training performance. (A‑10-XX)
9. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to include the training records requested in Safety Recommendation [6] as part of the remedial training program requested in Safety Recommendation A-05-14.
10. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to provide the training records requested in Safety Recommendation [6] to hiring employers to fulfill their requirement under Pilot Records Improvement Act.
11. Develop a process for verifying, validating, auditing, and amending pilot training records at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the records. (A‑10‑XX)
12. Direct all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of airplanes equipped with a reference speeds switch or similar device to (1) develop procedures to establish that, during approach and landing, airspeed reference bugs are always matched to the position of the switch and (2) implement specific training to ensure that pilots demonstrate proficiency in this area. (A-10-XX)
13. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 142 training centers to develop and conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed; are unexpected; involve autopilot disengagement; and include airplane-specific features, such as a reference speeds switch. (A-10-XX)
14. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of stick pusher-equipped aircraft to provide their pilots with pusher familiarization simulator training. (A-10-XX) (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-07-4)
15. Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to support an expanded set of stall recovery training requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should address areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing, proof-of-match with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded. (A-10-XX)
16. Identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly state this lack of susceptibility and contain no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures. (A-10-XX)
17. Develop more stringent standards for surveillance of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, 135, and 91K operators that are experiencing rapid growth, increased complexity of operations, accidents and/or incidents, or other changes that warrant increased oversight, including the following: (1) verify that inspector staffing is adequate to accomplish the enhanced surveillance that is promulgated by the new standards, (2) increase staffing for those certificates with insufficient staffing levels, and (3) augment the inspector staff with available and airplane-type-qualified inspectors from all Federal Aviation Administration regions and 14 CFR Part 142 training centers to provide quality assurance over the operators’ aircrew program designee workforce. (A-10-XX)
18. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to (1) develop and implement flight operational quality assurance programs that collect objective flight data; (2) analyze these data and implement corrective actions to identified systems safety issues; and (3) share the deidentified aggregate data generated through these analyses with other interested parties in the aviation industry through appropriate means. (A‑10‑XX)
19. Seek specific statutory and/or regulatory authority to protect data that operators share with the Federal Aviation Administration as part of any flight operational quality assurance program. (A‑10‑XX)
20. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to (1) routinely download and analyze all available sources of safety information, as part of their flight operational quality assurance program, to identify deviations from established norms and procedures; (2) provide appropriate protections to ensure the confidentiality of the deidentified aggregate data; and (3) ensure that this information is used for safety-related and not punitive purposes. (A-10-XX)
21. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to incorporate explicit guidance to pilots, including checklist reminders as appropriate, prohibiting the use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck. (A‑10‑XX)
22. Implement a process to document that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators have taken appropriate action in response to safety-critical information transmitted through the safety alert for operators process or another method. (A-10-XX)
23. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to revise the methodology for programming their adverse weather phenomena reporting and forecasting subsystems so that the subsystem-generated weather document for each flight contains all pertinent weather information, including Airmen’s Meteorological Information, Significant Meteorological Information, and other National Weather Service in-flight weather advisories, and omits weather information that is no longer valid. (A‑10-XX)
24. Require principal operations inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to periodically review the weather documents generated for their carriers to verify that those documents are consistent with the information requested in Safety Recommendation [21] (A‑10-XX)
25. Update the definitions for reportable icing intensities in the Aeronautical Information Manual so that the definitions are consistent with the more detailed intensities defined in Advisory Circular 91‑74A, “Pilot Guide: Flight in Icing Conditions.” (A-10-XX)

Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in This Report

The NTSB reiterates the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Require all Part 121 and 135 air carriers to obtain any notices of disapproval for flight checks for certificates and ratings for all pilot applicants and evaluate this information before making a hiring decision. (A-05-1)

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish training programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training environment that would require a review of their whole performance history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected. (A-05-14)

Require that all pilot training programs be modified to contain modules that teach and emphasize monitoring skills and workload management and include opportunities to practice and demonstrate proficiency in these areas. (A-07-13)

Previously Issued Recommendations Reclassified in This Report

Safety Recommendation A-07-13 is reclassified “Open—Unacceptable Response” in section 2.3.1 of this report.

Safety Recommendations A-03-53 and -54 are reclassified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded” in section 2.3.3 of this report. The recommendations are superseded by Safety Recommendation [2].

Safety Recommendation A-07-8 is reclassified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded” in section 2.4.2 of this report. The recommendation is superseded by Safety Recommendation [4].

Safety Recommendation A-05-1 is reclassified “Open—Unacceptable Response” in section 2.7.3 of this report.

Safety Recommendation A-07-4 is reclassified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded” in section 2.9.1 of this report. The recommendation is superseded by Safety Recommendation [12].

Related information:

Press Release
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Accident Docket

Staffing At Busy New York Radar Facility Dips To Post 1981 Low

Staffing At Busy New York Radar Facility Dips To Post 1981 Low
By Mike Mitchell
AvStop.com

February 3, 2010 – WESTBURY, N.Y. – Staffing of fully trained and certified air traffic controllers at the FAA radar facility that handles the climb and approach phases of flight in the busy New York airspace, including all flights into and out of Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark airports, has reached a critically low level after dropping 25 percent in the last six years.

In 2004, the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) was authorized by the FAA to have 270 air traffic controllers but only had 211 fully trained and certified controllers on board, which represented an alarming shortage in its own right. But today, the total has dropped to 158 fully trained and certified controllers, of which more than two dozen are eligible for retirement today. The 158 figure represents the lowest staffing level at the facility since the PATCO strike of 1981.

Within the next five years, more than 60 additional controllers will be able to retire. There is no relief in sight, as there have been only three new hires since 2006 that have successfully completed the training and certification process at a facility that is best suited only for experienced controllers to make it.

ATC Staffing Dangerously Low At Busy California FAA Facility. The number of fully trained and certified air traffic controllers at Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), the nation’s busiest Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control facility that handles the climb and approach phases of flight, has plummeted 26 percent in the last six years,

These alarming numbers have drawn the attention of the New York Congressional delegation, which, in a Jan. 28 letter to Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, wrote, “we are deeply concerned about the current staffing shortage and future wave of retirements at the New York TRACON and the effects this could have on the safety and efficiency of air travel in the New York region.”

“What we need from the FAA is a responsible, long-term plan to correct the staffing problem from the bottom up and controllers would like to be part of the process for discussing the issue and devising that plan with the FAA,” New York TRACON NATCA Facility Representative Dean Iacopelli said.

“The key to properly staffing the New York TRACON is attracting and retaining experienced air traffic controllers. Not utilizing the promotion process that gives experienced controllers the opportunity to bid on jobs at the New York TRACON is counterproductive. The FAA’s plan to place inexperienced, newly-hired trainees here couldn’t be worse for the system from a safety standpoint and will adversely affect system efficiency as well.” NATCA joins all New York members of Congress in their concern about the facility’s low staffing level.

The New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), is located at 1515 Stewart Avenue in Westbury, New York. New York TRACON, which is also known as N90, is a consolidated TRACON meaning that all its radar facilities are in one location. The primary responsibility of the New York TRACON is the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of arrival, departure, and en-route traffic. N90 is responsible for three major airports: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and LaGuardia Airport.

Additionally, N90 is responsible for dozens of smaller but busy fields, including Long Island MacArthur Airport, Teterboro Airport, Tweed New Haven Regional Airport, and Republic Airport. N90 also controls the large number of VFR aircraft that fly through the New York Class Bravo Airspace everyday.

The New York TRACON is a Level 12 facility and one of seven “Large TRACONs” currently existing throughout the United States. The others include the Atlanta Large TRACON, the Boston TRACON, the Potomac TRACON, the Southern California TRACON, the Dallas Fort Worth TRACON (D10), and the Northern California TRACON.

Who Is Responsible for the Crash of Colgan Flight 3407?

Who Is Responsible for the Crash of Colgan Flight 3407?
By Rich Wyeroski
Former FAA Inspector

Last February 2009, Colgan Air flight #3407 crashed in upstate New York while on approach to land at Buffalo International Airport. A lot has been written since then about the cause of the accident. There have been two Senate hearings and a Congressional investigation. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is still investigating and has not yet come up with a cause.  We all listened in horror to the cockpit recordings of the last minutes of the flight that killed fifty people.  We ask ourselves, “Why did it happen?”

The NTSB is tasked with determining the exact causes of aircraft accidents.  NTSB investigations over the years have blamed the FAA as being responsible for aircraft accidents because of  “Lack of Oversight.”  It is an official term meaning that, if the FAA was properly doing its job, the accident may have been prevented.  The FAA has made mistakes in the past, causing accidents.  In some instances, aircraft designs needed to be changed to the make the aircraft safer. An airport tower controller was at fault, or maybe pilot training is a problem. These, of course, are errors and mistakes.  We are human and mistakes will be made. The FAA calls it “Lessons Learned,” fixes the mistake and life goes on.

Immediately upon taking office, President Obama appointed a new Department of Transportation (DOT) Secretary, Raymond LaHood.  Mr. LaHood has experience in aviation and immediately set to work changing the FAA.  In May 2009 he appointed Randall Babbitt the new FAA Administrator.  Mr. Babbitt also has a background in aviation.  In the past, most DOT and FAA appointments were people with little or no experience in aviation. This, of course, seems like a good start to fix the problems in aviation.  In a statement to the media this past June, LaHood and Babbitt both agreed that the past administration is responsible for the problems with the FAA.  They stated, “The problems of the past will not happen under a LaHood-Babbitt administration.”  Strong words for a new administration!

Last year, former FAA management was accused by Congress of misleading them during Congressional hearings about a “cozy relationship” between the FAA and Southwest Airlines.  As a former safety inspector, I have seen first hand FAA not reporting accidents and incidents properly.  Mishaps with two aircraft almost hitting one another on a runway were classified as a pilot deviation.  Near midair collisions were not disclosed or were again reported as pilot deviations. FAA was once more misleading Congress and the American people!

The cause of the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 will be decided soon. The FAA will likely be found guilty with “Lack of Proper Oversight”’ a contributing factor.  It appears the pilots had training and experience issues.  NTSB will put the most blame on them.  After all, if FAA was properly doing its job, the problems of an air carrier would be caught during routine surveillance.  Administrator Babbitt stated in the media that he has found unacceptable procedures in regional airline operations. The Administrator is a pilot and knows problems with an airline when he sees them.  Yes, the FAA is to blame for the Colgan crash.  The question is the extent to which the FAA is really responsible.

Startling accusations have been reported in the media that FAA actually prevented their own inspector from reporting problems a full year before the crash. Those accusations are pending an investigation. However, it was further discovered that FAA inspector Chris Monteleon, the individual who had responsibility for Colgan Air, personally observed problems with a fight crew at Colgan and opened an investigation on the airline.  FAA management abruptly closed the investigation and removed Mr. Montelon pending disciplinary action.  One wonders why.  Why would the FAA do something like this to one of their own inspector?

So, who is responsible for the crash of Colgan flight 3407?  Obviously, there were crew problems and the FAA did not inspect the air carrier properly.  The agency clearly is guilty of a lack of proper oversight.  Or is the FAA guilty of a more serious crime?  What are the ramifications of FAA management deliberately not addressing observed problems with one of their operators and removing their own inspector in the course of doing his required surveillance?  How could they possibly justify closing the investigation against the will of that inspector? Eleven months later, the Colgan Air crash occurred.  Could this terrible accident have been prevented if FAA had acted in accordance with their mandate to protect the flying public?  We may never know.  By going against their own law, the FAA unquestionably never even gave itself the opportunity.

Richard Wyeroski is a former FAA Inspector based at the Farmingdale Flight Standards District Office at Republic Airport.  Richard is a member of the FAA Whistleblowers Alliance, an organization made up of current and former FAA employees dedicated to monitoring and reporting serious issues about the FAA. Email rwyeroski@optonline.net.

3 old issues, 25 new ones are pursued

3 old issues, 25 new ones are pursued
Past recommendations ignored, official says
By Jerry Zremski and Tom Precious
NEWS STAFF REPORTERS
Updated: February 03, 2010, 10:28 am /
Published: February 03, 2010, 12:30 am

WASHINGTON — The National Transportation Safety Board on Tuesday renewed three safety recommendations and issued 25 new ones in the wake of the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407 — a tragedy that the board’s chairwoman said was a sure sign of what happens when such recommendations are ignored.

“It’s taken 50 more lives for us to focus additional attention on these issues that have not been addressed” by the aviation industry, including the Federal Aviation Administration, said the chairwoman, Deborah A. P. Hersman.

The FAA has failed to address past safety board recommendations on pilot training, though they came up in previous crashes, Hersman said, and she welcomed congressional involvement to force action on issues the agency has ignored.

“I feel like we are in that movie ‘Groundhog Day,’ ” she said. “It is the same thing all over again.”

Given that the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 3407 did not notice that they had let the plane slow to the point where a stall warning would sound, the safety board renewed its recommendation that pilot-training programs be modified to bolster instrument-monitoring skills.

Given that Colgan Air, the Continental subcontractor that operated the flight, hired Capt. Marvin D. Renslow without the company knowing he had failed three test flights, the board recommended that all test flight information be available and evaluated before an airline makes a hiring decision.

And given that Renslow had a history of poor performance as an aviator, the agency renewed its recommendation that all airlines be required to offer remedial training for their weaker pilots.

Hersman urged the FAA to adopt those long-standing safety recommendations and the new ones the safety board set forth.

Beyond the renewed recommendations, the safety board added 25 new suggestions for the FAA to consider.

The recommendations would require airlines to make sure pilots are properly monitoring the plane’s controls, and to ensure that all pilots get trained in a simulator on the stick pusher — part of the stall-recovery system that Renslow grossly mishandled — and all facets of stall recovery.

The other recommendations include:

• Boosting training for poorly performing pilots such as Renslow.

• Requiring that airlines keep better records of their training.

• Bolstering leadership training for pilots being promoted to captain.

• Requiring airlines to address risks associated with pilots commuting a long distance from their home to begin their work shift.

• Requiring the installation of low-airspeed alert systems in commercial aircraft.

• Increasing FAA oversight of fast-growing airlines such as Colgan.

The stall-recovery training recommendation was the focus of much discussion at Tuesday’s safety board meeting, with investigators saying there’s good reason why all airlines should offer training in the stick pusher.

The airline industry’s standards for stall training “may not have been sufficient” to teach pilots how to handle stalls, said John M. Cox, operations group chairman for the safety board. He noted that simulator training often features predictable stall incidents.

Remarkably, Cox said NTSB investigators found that in tests, most Colgan pilots on the Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 twin-engine turboprop — the type of plane that crashed in Clarence Center — tried to override the “stick pusher” devices, just as Renslow did. Investigators reiterated the need for teaching leadership — cockpit command skills — to first officers who upgrade to captain.

At Colgan, there was a one-day course for pilots going from the right seat to the captain’s left seat, and it’s mostly about administrative matters, said Evan Byrne, chairman of the investigation’s human-performance group.

While interest in those training- related recommendations was unanimous, the safety board members and staff engaged in some disagreement on the need for a new low-speed warning system.

Byrne noted that the crew of Flight 3407 did not notice obvious signs that the plane was getting too slow to fly, and said that one more cue might have gone unnoticed, too.

But safety board member Robert L. Sumwalt stressed that many planes include audible and visual warnings when a plane is going too slow. And the board agreed with him that all planes should have such warning systems.

As significant as the board’s safety recommendations were, one was conspicuous by its absence. The board did not recommend requiring new co-pilots to have the same 1,500 hours of flight experience that pilots are required to have — which is one of the central goals of the Families of Continental Flight 3407, which has lobbied Congress for that change.

Quality of training is far more important than the quantity of hours any one pilot has under his or her belt, said Tom Haueter, director of the board’s Office of Aviation Safety.

Pilots could build their hours dusting crops or flying banners along a beach, Haueter noted. “Does that really help you to be an airline pilot?”

In the face of the criticism it faced at the safety board meeting, the FAA defended itself in an unsigned statement.

“In the past year, the FAA has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training and background checks,” the statement said.

Nevertheless, the NTSB dismissed as a bloated claim the FAA’s recent contention that most regional airlines have joined or soon will join a key voluntary safety program that encourages airline employees to report safety violations.

Sumwalt said he worries about the “bottom feeder” airlines that may say they will partake in such programs but will never invest the money to do so. He said the airlines should be compelled to join that safety program, and the full board and Hersman agreed.

“What about all the other regional carriers?” Hersman said. “Do we have to wait for them to get into an accident” and be brought before the NTSB before starting such efforts?

Cox said, “It does seem to be a motivator.”

jzremski@buffnews.com and tprecious@buffnews.com

NTSB Colgan 3407 Investigation Report Takes Step Backward in Enhancing Safety

Release #10.004
February 2, 2010

NTSB Colgan 3407 Investigation Report Takes Step Backward in Enhancing Safety
Single Probable Cause Fails to Acknowledge Need to Enhance Pilot Screening, Training, and Mentoring

WASHINGTON – Discussion during today’s National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Sunshine Meeting on the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident highlighted many long-standing aviation safety priorities of the Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l (ALPA), including identifying a clear need to improve pilot screening, training, and mentoring, and modernize flight-time/duty-time regulations for airline pilots. However, the Board ignored the bulk of these factors in its statement of probable cause.

“We are deeply disappointed that the NTSB’s probable cause statement abandoned the systems approach to accident investigation that the International Civil Aviation Organization and other agencies around the world are adopting,” said Capt. John Prater, ALPA’s president. “During its discussions, the Board identified the need to improve training, develop experience, improve cockpit displays, enhance oversight, and provide better weather information to crews. However, the statement of probable cause failed to fully and directly acknowledge the many factors that contributed to this accident. Creating a safer industry means looking at all the reasons why this tragedy occurred and taking aggressive action to ensure nothing similar happens again.”

“With today’s report, the Board has missed a valuable opportunity to highlight the many factors that combined to cause this tragedy,” said Prater. “The conclusion of simple pilot error ignores the multitude of contributing factors in every accident. The single, narrow focus of the probable cause statement issued today is an unfortunate move backward away from that goal.”

For decades, ALPA has advocated for improved pilot training that reflects all aspects of being a professional airline pilot. Adequate training is particularly important for unexpected, abnormal, and potentially hazardous situations. Crew Resource Management and command training are also essential, so that pilots learn the judgment and leadership skills that they need to manage their work in the cockpit.

“Training is an investment in safety, but it is expensive and the current structure of our industry economically penalizes those airline managements that seek to do more than the minimum training required,” said Capt. Paul Rice, ALPA’s first vice-president. “While we’ve seen encouraging progress in improving pilot training and developing tailored programs that reflect pilots’ skills and experience, our industry must do much more to achieve the highest training standards possible.”

In addition, ALPA has long urged the FAA to create new flight-time and duty-time and minimum rest requirements for all types of flying, from long-haul international to multi-leg domestic. While the Association has worked for decades to address pilot fatigue, ALPA pilots have most recently participated in the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which was charged with making recommendations for updating the rules.

“The FAA’s timeline for modernizing airline pilots’ flight-time and duty-time has slipped from the original target,” continued Prater. “For years, ALPA has been calling for science-based rules that apply equally to all operations, including domestic, international, and supplemental flying. Our passengers and crews deserve to have a final rule in place before the end of 2010.”

ALPA also emphasizes airline management’s role and responsibility in developing a corporate culture centered on safety and that is designed to detect trends and implement solutions to enhance safety.

“Airline management plays a pivotal role in setting the tone for safety and professionalism at an individual airline,” said Capt. Rory Kay, ALPA’s Executive Air Safety Chairman. “Pilots, and all employees, must feel confident that they can report issues through non-punitive safety reporting programs without fear of retribution, as part of a corporate culture that is firmly focused on creating the safest possible flight operations.”

Given ALPA’s long-standing efforts to continuously enhance professionalism among our members and throughout the industry, we fully expect to make a valuable contribution to the NTSB’s upcoming forum on pilot and air traffic controller excellence that was announced at today’s hearing.

The Association adopted its Code of Ethics in 1956. Since then, the Association has taken many actions to promote the highest possible standards of conduct for airline pilots. Nearly all ALPA-represented pilot groups have Professional Standards Committees charged with maintaining the highest degree of professional conduct. In September 2009, ALPA released a white paper titled “Producing a Professional Airline Pilot” that frames the Association’s recommendations for candidate screening, hiring, training, and mentoring.

“When management supports professional standards committees, these groups can make a significant contribution to advancing safety at the airline and even establish best practices for the industry,” said Rice. “It is unfortunate that many airline managements still fail to seize the opportunity to work with ALPA on professional standards and other safety initiatives, but we’ve seen some positive developments in the past year.”

“Recently, Colgan Air has worked together with its pilots to address safety issues and capitalize on safety reporting programs as a way to identify and solve issues before accidents or incidents occur,” said Capt. Mark Segaloff, chairman of the Colgan pilots’ chapter of ALPA. “We are seeing signs of progress and look forward to future collaborative efforts at Colgan Air.”

Founded in 1931, ALPA is the world’s largest pilot union, representing more than 53,000 pilots at 37 airlines in the United States and Canada. Visit the ALPA website at www.alpa.org.

###

CONTACT: Linda Shotwell, 703/481-4440 or media@alpa.org

CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 2, 2010
SB-10-02

CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the captain of Colgan Air flight 3407 inappropriately responded to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. In a report adopted today in a public Board meeting in Washington, additional flight crew failures were noted as causal to the accident.

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8- 400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The report states that, when the stick shaker activated to warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the captain should have responded correctly to the situation by pushing forward on the control column. However, the captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall.

Contributing to the cause of the accident were the Crewmembers’ failure to recognize the position of the low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that the stick shaker was about to activate, and their failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other contributing factors were the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight and Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding strategies to prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot records, stall training, and airspeed selection procedures. Additional recommendations address FAA’s oversight and use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information, flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs, use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, and weather information provided to pilots.

At today’s meeting, the Board announced that two issues that had been encountered in the Colgan Air investigation would be studied at greater length in proceedings later this year. The Board will hold a public forum this Spring exploring pilot and air traffic control high standards. This accident was one in a series of incidents investigated by the Board in recent years – including a mid-air collision over the Hudson River that raised questions of air traffic control vigilance, and the Northwest Airlines incident last year where the airliner overflew its destination airport in Minneapolis because the pilots were distracted by non-flying activities – that have involved air transportation professionals deviating from expected levels of performance. In addition, this Fall the Board will hold a public forum on code sharing, the practice of airlines marketing their services to the public while using other companies to actually perform the transportation. For example, this accident occurred on a Continental Connection flight, although the transportation was provided by Colgan Air.

A summary of the findings of the Board’s report are available on the NTSB’s website at: http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm.

-30-

NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway
hollow@ntsb.gov
(202) 314-6100

FAA Statement after NTSB recommendations

For Immediate Release
February 2, 2010
Phone: (202) 267-3883

FAA Statement

In the past year, the FAA has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training, and background checks. We will soon publish proposed federal rules to prevent pilot fatigue and further improve training. Airline passengers deserve an expertly trained and well rested crew, whether they are flying on a major or a regional jet. Pilots must be trained for the mission they are flying and the FAA already is working to further improve their professional qualifications. The FAA will review and evaluate today’s NTSB recommendations to help determine what further actions may be needed.

###

Controllers: FAA plan could jeopardize safety

Controllers: FAA plan could jeopardize safety
By Edd Pritchard
CantonRep.com staff writer
February 2, 2010

Disappointed air traffic controllers are meeting with area pilots to explain a Federal Aviation Administration plan for changes at northern Ohio airports.

The FAA is considering moving terminal radar approach controllers from the Akron-Canton Airport tower to a central location in Cleveland.

The National Air Traffic Controllers Association is against the move. They argue it could jeopardize safety.

NATCA members — including national representatives — met Tuesday with pilots in Wooster and Akron. They planned more meetings at 9 a.m. today at Harry Clever Airport in New Philadelphia and at noon at Carroll County-Tolson Airport in Carrollton.

Terminal radar approach controllers at Akron-Canton help pilots after takeoff or as they approach and prepare to land.

The FAA is considering a move that would consolidate terminal radar approach controllers from Akron-Canton with crews from airports in Mansfield, Youngstown and Toledo.

The move won’t be made until November 2013. A similar move has been made with controllers in Dayton going to a consolidated center in Columbus.

NATCA members have questioned the changes for more than a year. They also have support from some Ohio congressional delegation members who have been questioning the FAA about its plans. On Tuesday, U.S. Rep. John Boccieri, D-Alliance, asked FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt for more information about the plan.

NATCA spokeswoman Alex Caldwell said the union is asking FAA officials to include air controllers in discussions of planned changes.

The proposed plan establishes large controller stations in Columbus and Cleveland, but doesn’t provide redundant support in case of a problem at one of the locations, Caldwell said.

Under the current setup, controllers are familiar with the area around the airports where they work. That could change if controllers are consolidated, Caldwell said.